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Abstract	
Although	 there	 is	 increasing	 academic	 recognition	 of	 corporations	 as	 criminogenic,	 the	
criminal	legal	system	has	demonstrated	difficulties	in	conceptualising	corporate	culpability.	
The	current	Royal	Commission	into	Institutional	Responses	to	Child	Sexual	Abuse	provides	
ample	evidence	of	why	organisations	can	and	should	be	criminalised	for	systemic	failures.	
I	demonstrate	that	the	emphasis	upon	individualistic	subjective	culpability	by	the	criminal	
legal	system	does	not	adequately	encapsulate	the	institutional	failings	detailed	before	the	
Royal	Commission.	Whilst	mandatory	reporting	offences	are	important,	these	offences	do	
not	 adequately	 respond	 to	 the	 kinds	 of	 organisational	 failings	 identified	 by	 the	 Royal	
Commission.	I	argue	in	favour	of	developing	a	new	institutional	offence	constructed	upon	
realist	concepts	of	negligence	and/or	corporate	culture	that	recognises	that	organisations	
are	 capable	 of	 wrongdoing	 and	 sufficiently	 blameworthy	 to	 justify	 the	 imposition	 of	
criminal	sanctions.	I	conclude	by	arguing	that	the	expressive	role	of	criminal	law	justifies	
and	requires	the	criminalisation	of	this	kind	of	organisational	wrongdoing.	
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Introduction	
The	ongoing	Australian	Royal	Commission	into	Institutional	Responses	Child	Sexual	Abuse	(Royal	
Commission)	proffers	an	opportunity	to	reform	criminal	legal	system	responses	to	harms	caused	
by	or	within	organisations.	The	focus	of	the	Royal	Commission	has	demonstrated	the	significance	
of	institutional	failures	to	prevent	and/or	adequately	respond	to	child	sexual	abuse.	There	is	a	
disjunction	between	the	condemnation	of	organisations	articulated	by	the	Royal	Commission	and	
the	criminal	legal	response.	There	has,	in	fact,	been	no	criminal	justice	response	whatsoever	to	
organisational	failures	to	prevent	child	sexual	abuse	within	institutions	caring	for	children.	This	
mirrors	concerns	articulated	generally	in	academic	literature	about	the	disjunction	between	the	
social	 and	moral	 condemnation	of	 organisations	 and	 the	 legal	 position	 of	 these	 organisations	
(Colvin	1995).	A	key	obstacle	militating	against	 criminalising	organisations	 is	 the	difficulty	of	
conceptualising	organisational	fault	due	to	the	dominance	of	individualistic	subjective	culpability	
in	 criminal	 legal	 attributions	of	blameworthiness.	This	 article	explores	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	
criminal	 legal	 system’s	 emphasis	 upon	 individualistic	 subjective	 fault	 is	 inadequate	 in	 its	
response	to	organisational	 failures	and	explores	 the	ways	 in	which	organisations	should	have	
some	 criminal	 liability	 for	 the	 creation,	 management	 and	 response	 to	 risk	 when	 it	 has	
materialised	in	harm	to	a	child.	This	article	endorses	the	creation	of	a	new	offence	criminalising	
institutional	child	sexual	abuse	built	around	the	concept	of	failure.		
	
The	Royal	Commission	into	Institutional	Responses	to	Child	Sexual	Abuse	commenced	in	2013	
and	 has	 been	 extended	 to	 continue	 until	 the	 end	 of	 2017.2	 At	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 the	 Royal	
Commission	 had	 completed	 its	 last	 of	 57	 public	 hearings,	 and	 held	more	 than	 6,600	 private	
sessions	 with	 victim/survivors	 of	 child	 sexual	 abuse,	 with	 more	 than	 1,800	 people	 awaiting	
private	sessions.	The	formal	public	hearings	examine	evidence	about	child	sexual	abuse	and	how	
institutions	have	(not)	responded	to	allegations	of	abuse.	The	public	hearings	are	open	to	the	
general	public	and	are	also	telecast	live	on	the	web,	the	transcripts	are	available	on	the	website	
and	 the	 findings	 are	 then	 presented	 in	 Reports.	 The	 Royal	 Commission	 has	 considered	 child	
sexual	 abuse	 in	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 institutions	 including	 schools,	 after‐school	 care,	 religious	
organisations,	 the	 Australian	 Defence	 Force,	 the	 entertainment	 industry,	 sporting	 clubs,	 and	
health	care	providers.	The	Royal	Commission	has	provided	an	extraordinary	amount	of	detail	
about	systemic	failure	and	its	impacts	upon	child	sex	offending	and	reactions	by	the	institution,	
and	highlights	the	need	to	hold	organisations	criminally	responsible	for	these	failures.	It	is	part	
of	a	 series	of	public	 inquiries	 that	have	occurred	 internationally	 into	 institutional	 child	abuse	
(Daly	 2014;	 Swain	 2014).3	 The	 Royal	 Commission,	 like	 the	 other	 public	 inquiries,	 offers	 an	
opportunity	for	legislators	to	address	the	unsatisfactory	criminal	justice	response	to	institutional	
child	sexual	abuse.	This	potential	can	be	situated	as	part	of	the	criminal	legal	system’s	response	
(or	 lack	 thereof)	 to	organisational	or	corporate	malfeasance.	Reforms	 in	 relation	 to	corporate	
crime	have	often	been	motivated	by	particular	events.	For	example,	the	corporate	manslaughter	
reforms	in	the	United	Kingdom	were	motivated	by	unsuccessful	prosecutions	in	response	to	the	
deaths	 of	 193	 people	 on	 the	Herald	 of	Free	Enterprise	 in	 1987	 and	 the	 Southall	 rail	 crash	 in	
September	1997.4	Accordingly,	the	current	Royal	Commission	could	act	as	a	catalyst	for	reforms	
to	criminal	legal	system	responses	to	institutional	wrongdoing.	
	
Corporate	 criminal	 responsibility	 ‘is	 often	 tolerated	 rather	 than	 encouraged’	 (Wells	 2014).	
Corporate	criminal	law	has	emerged	on	a	case–by‐case	and,	more	recently,	a	statute‐by‐statute	
basis	with	a	consequent	 lack	of	general	principles	(with	a	notable	exception	of	 the	Australian	
Model	 Criminal	 Code—Criminal	Code	Act	1995	 (Cth)—discussed	 below).	 There	 is	 a	wealth	 of	
excellent	literature	about	the	difficulties	the	criminal	legal	system	has	in	grappling	with	corporate	
responsibility	 (Fisse	 and	 Braithwaite	 1993;	 Gilchrist	 2012‐2013;	 Gunningham	 1987;	 Wells,	
2014).	 In	 particular,	 the	 general	 principles	 of	 criminal	 law	were	 constructed	 based	 primarily	
upon	 individual	 responsibility,	 and	 this	 has	 meant	 that	 the	 criminal	 legal	 system	 has	 had	
difficulties	in	responding	to	the	developing	dominance	of	business	corporations	(Wells	2014).	A	
complicating	 factor	 in	 conceptualising	 organisational	 liability	 is	 that	many	 of	 the	 institutions	
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involved	 are	not	 regarded	 as	 corporations	 at	 law	 and	 thus	 evade	 corporate	 liability	 (Gleeson	
2016).	The	Royal	Commission	has	adopted	a	realist	perspective	with	regard	to	institutions	that	
are	 the	subject	of	 the	 inquiry,	 focusing	on	 institutions	and	 their	 failure	 to	protect	against	and	
respond	to	child	sexual	abuse	rather	than	definitions	at	corporate	law	which	are	designed,	and	
have	 been	 used,	 to	 protect	 against	 institutional	 liability	 (Doyle	 and	Rubino	 2003‐2004).	 This	
article	 reflects	 a	 similar	 approach.	 Whilst	 the	 bulk	 of	 academic	 research	 into	 organisational	
liability	 revolves	 around	 corporate	 law,	 this	 article	 adopts	 a	 broad	 definition	 and	 refers	 to	
‘organisations’	throughout	to	include	not	only	legal	‘corporations’	but	also	institutions,	such	as	
the	Catholic	Church,	in	constructions	of	organisational	criminal	liability.	The	focus	of	this	article	
is	upon	the	ways	in	which	the	criminal	legal	system’s	focus	on	individualistic	fault	is	inadequate	
and	the	consequent	need	to	construct	collective	models	of	fault	that	more	accurately	reflect	and	
reinforce	organisational	responsibility.	
	
The	continuing	discomfort	with	organisational	 liability	has	unfortunately	been	reflected	in	the	
recent	proposals	by	 the	Royal	Commission	 for	 criminal	 law	reform	 in	 the	Consultation	Paper:	
Criminal	Justice	(the	 ‘Consultation	Paper’)	(Royal	Commission	2016a).	The	central	focus	of	the	
Royal	 Commission	 is	 in	 its	 title:	 ‘…	 Institutional	 [emphasis	 added]	 Responses	 to	 Child	 Sexual	
Abuse’.	This	is	also	emphasised	by	the	Letters	Patent	which	require	the	Commission	to	consider	
the	 role	 of	 institutions	 where	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 has	 occurred	 and	 their	 activities	 that	 have	
‘created,	facilitated,	increased,	or	in	any	way	contributed	to,	(whether	by	act	or	omission)	the	risk	
of	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 or	 the	 circumstances	 or	 conditions	 giving	 rise	 to	 that	 risk’	 (	 Royal	
Commission	2014b:	m(iv)).	However,	the	Consultation	Paper	suggests	that,	despite	the	details	in	
the	Royal	Commission	case	studies	(numbering	57	at	time	of	writing	and	henceforth	referred	to	
as	 ‘the	 Reports’),	 the	 Royal	 Commission’s	 focus	 has	 remained	 primarily	 on	 individual	
responsibility,	specifically	the	criminalisation	of	child	sexual	abusers,	and	improving	the	response	
of	the	criminal	justice	system	to	individuals.	This	article	does	not	suggest	that	these	reforms	are	
not	important.	But	what	is	disappointing	is	the	minimal	amount	of	time	that	has	been	devoted	to	
the	conceptually	challenging	area	of	organisational	or	corporate	liability.	Of	the	almost	800‐page	
Consultation	Paper,	only	 ten	pages,	or	part	of	one	of	 the	15	chapters,	are	 focused	on	criminal	
justice	 responses	 to	 institutional	 failings.	 The	 bulk	 of	 analysis	 regarding	 organisational	
wrongdoing	 is	 actually	 in	 a	 separate	 report,	Sentencing	 for	Child	Sexual	Abuse	 in	 Institutional	
Contexts	(the	‘Sentencing	Report’)	(Freiberg	et	al.	2015).	Arguably,	the	capacity	for	the	authors	to	
focus	 on	 criminalising	 organisational	 wrongdoing	 was	 beyond	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 brief	 of	 the	
Sentencing	Report	as	no	organisations	have	been	punished	for	collective	wrongdoing.	However,	
the	authors	justified	their	approach	in	a	chapter	titled	‘Institutional	Offending:	The	Limits	of	the	
Law’:	 ‘the	 power	 to	 sentence	 is	 contingent	 upon	 the	 conviction,	 or	 finding	 of	 guilt,	 of	 the	
perpetrator.	 Sentencing	of	offenders	 for	 child	sexual	abuse	 focuses	on	 individuals	 rather	 than	
institutions	 or	 organisations’	 (Freiberg	 et	 al.	 2015).	 Freiberg	 et	 al.	 go	 on	 to	 consider	 how	
institutions	might	be	criminally	prosecuted	 in	 relation	 to	 institutional	 child	 sexual	 abuse	as	a	
precursor	to	analysing	potential	for	sentencing.	The	arguments	detailed	in	the	Sentencing	Report	
are	later	referred	to	in	the	Consultation	Paper.		
	
The	focus	of	this	article	is	not	upon	the	sex	offender,	but	the	institutions	that	failed	to	prevent	
and/or	react	to	the	abuse.	I	analyse	proposed	reforms	in	light	of	the	details	provided	in	selected	
Reports	published	on	 the	Royal	Commission	website	of	public	hearings	of	case	studies.	These	
Reports	detail	quotations	and	summaries	of	witness	statements,	 relevant	historic	and	current	
legislative	and	regulatory	frameworks,	and	findings	of	and	recommendations	made	by	the	Royal	
Commission.	 The	 evidence	 and	 findings	 of	 the	 Royal	 Commission	 demonstrate	 that	 an	
organisational	 model	 of	 culpability	 must	 be	 developed	 in	 order	 to	 adequately	 respond	 to	
institutional	child	sexual	abuse.	A	key	concern	of	this	present	article	is	that	organisations	are	most	
likely	to	cause	systemic	harms,	and	yet	the	more	complex	an	organisation,	the	less	likely	it	is	to	
be	held	criminally	responsible	(Crofts	2016;	Veitch	2007).	For	the	purposes	of	my	analysis,	I	focus	
upon	 the	Report	of	Case	Study	Number	12:	The	Response	of	an	 Independent	School	 in	Perth	 to	
Concerns	Raised	about	the	Conduct	of	a	Teacher	between	1999	and	2009	(Report	No.	12).	Report	
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No.	12	 (Royal	Commission	2015b)	 analyses	 the	 response	 (or	 lack	 thereof)	 to	 concerns	 raised	
between	1999	and	2009	by	several	teachers	and	a	parent	about	the	behaviour	of	a	male	teacher,	
YJ,	in	the	preparatory	school	towards	a	number	of	his	students.	The	abuse	was	finally	reported	to	
police	in	September	2009	and	YJ	was	charged	and	convicted	of	committing	sexual	offences	against	
five	students.	All	of	the	victims	were	pupils	in	one	of	YJ’s	classes	at	the	time	of	the	offending.	I	
have	selected	Report	No.	12	because	it	is	sadly	illustrative	of	the	kinds	of	 institutional	failures	
detailed	in	all	of	the	Royal	Commission	findings.	Through	this	case	study,	I	demonstrate	some	of	
the	ways	in	which	the	individualistic	focus	of	the	criminal	legal	system	does	not	adequately	or	
accurately	encapsulate	the	collective,	institutional	failings	detailed	by	the	Royal	Commission.		
	
The	first	two	sections	of	this	article	focus	on	the	ways	that	the	individualistic	bias	in	the	criminal	
justice	system	construction	of	fault	fails	to	grapple	with	organisational	liability.	This	is	apparent	
firstly	in	the	continued	individualistic	bias	in	constructions	of	corporate	liability	generally,	and	
secondly	in	the	emphasis	upon	mandatory	reporting	offences	in	response	to	institutional	child	
sexual	abuse,	neither	of	which	adequately	responds	to	the	kinds	of	organisational	failings	detailed	
in	 the	 Royal	 Commission.	 In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	 argue	 in	 favour	 of	 developing	 a	 new	
institutional	 offence	constructed	upon	 the	concepts	of	negligence	and/or	corporate	 culture	 in	
accordance	with	a	realist	approach	that	recognises	that	organisations	are	capable	of	wrongdoing.	
I	 conclude	 by	 arguing	 that	 the	 expressive	 role	 of	 criminal	 law	 justifies	 and	 requires	 the	
criminalisation	of	this	kind	of	organisational	wrongdoing.	
	
Individualistic	bias	in	the	criminal	justice	system	and	conceptions	of	organisational	fault	
Historically,	the	criminal	legal	system	has	struggled	with	ascribing	responsibility	to	individuals	
within	 institutions	 who	 did	 not	 actually	 perpetrate	 a	 crime	 but	 could	 be	 described	 as	 ‘third	
parties’	responsible	for	the	care	of	victims	and/or	perpetrators.	The	individualistic	focus	of	the	
Consultation	 Paper	 reflects	 general	 principles	 of	 criminal	 law	 that	 have	 been	 developed	 and	
articulated	primarily	around	individual	responsibility.	There	are	exceptions,	such	as	the	doctrine	
of	 complicity	 and	 conspiracy,	 but	 this	 ‘group	 dimension’	 is	 characterised	 and	 regarded	 as	
exceptional.	 The	 individualistic	 focus	 of	 criminal	 law	 has	 been	 retained	 in	 the	 regulation	 of	
corporations.	 This	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 partly	 in	 the	 historic	 reluctance	 to	 criminalise	
organisations.	Legal	responses	have	been	hampered	by	the	idea	that	the	corporation	as	a	person	
was	a	fiction.	For	example:		
	
I	must	start	by	considering	the	nature	of	the	personality	which	by	a	fiction	the	law	
attributes	to	a	corporation.	A	living	person	has	a	mind	which	can	have	knowledge	
or	 intention	or	be	negligent	and	he	has	 the	hands	 to	carry	out	his	 intentions.	A	
corporation	 has	 none	 of	 these…	 (Lord	Reid,	Tesco	 Supermarkets	Ltd	 v	Nattrass	
1972	App	Cas	153,	170).	
	
One	traditional	argument	against	extending	liability	to	corporations	was	that	they	lacked	mens	
rea,	thus	raising	the	question	of	how	they	could	be	sufficiently	at	fault	to	justify	criminalisation.	
This	 reflects	 the	 contemporary	 emphasis	 upon	 the	 necessity	 of	 subjective	 culpability	 for	
attributions	of	blameworthiness	(Crofts	2013;	Fletcher	1978).	A	classic	response	to	this	has	been	
to	 create	 strict	 and	 absolute	 liability	 schemes	 that	 focus	 upon	 prohibited	 actions	 and/or	 the	
harms	 caused	 by	 organisations	 irrespective	 of	mens	 rea.	 Such	 regulatory	 schemes	 have	 been	
adopted	 in	 the	 area	 of	 Occupational	 Health	 and	 Safety	 and	 environmental	 offences.	 Research	
suggests,	however,	that	such	regulatory	offences	are	frequently	not	prosecuted	in	the	absence	of	
mens	rea	even	though	not	required	by	the	offences	(Korsell	2010).	A	more	recent	approach	is	to	
develop	an	argument	of	corporate	fault	analogous	to	individual	fault	through	concepts	such	as	
negligence	and	corporate	culture	(considered	below).	This	approach	asserts	that	organisations	
can	 and	 should	 be	 held	 responsible	 for	 creating	 an	 organisational	 environment	 that	 may	 be	
unsafe	and	therefore	criminally	dangerous.	On	this	account,	an	organisation	can	and	should	be	
regarded	as	at	fault	for	the	failure	to	properly	structure	and	co‐ordinate	its	responsibility	where	
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these	 systemic	 or	 cultural	 problems	 underpin	 harms.	 A	 second	 classic	 argument	 against	 the	
criminalisation	 of	 organisations	 was	 that	 traditional	 methods	 of	 punishment,	 in	 particular	
imprisonment,	could	not	be	applied	to	corporations	as	these	methods	were	constructed	around	
individuals	 rather	 than	 organisations	 (Coffee	 1981;	 Colvin	 1995).	 The	 issue	 of	 sanctions	 in	
response	 to	 organisational	malfeasance	 remains	 challenging	but	 jurisdictions	 have	developed	
innovative	sanctions	that	have	included	fines,	remedial	orders,	orders	for	the	advertisement	of	
convictions,	fines	and	the	nature	of	offences,	and	suspended	prosecutions	(Clough	and	Mulhern	
2002).	 These	 traditional	 arguments	 reflect	 and	 inform	 doubts	 as	 to	 whether	 or	 not	 it	 is	
appropriate	to	attribute	criminal	liability	to	organisations	that	cause	harm	but	are	not	without	
their	own	 internal	 shortcomings.	The	challenge	 remains	 to	 forge	a	 coherent	 link	between	 the	
general	 principles	 of	 criminal	 law	 and	 the	 realities	 of	 the	 corporate	 form,	 and	 this	 is	 not	
insurmountable.		
	
This	article	pursues	the	key	question	of	how	to	construct	the	fault	of	the	organisation	such	that	it	
is	worthy	 of	 criminal	 sanction.	 Individual	 subjective	 culpability	 has	 framed	 the	way	 in	which	
corporate	 offences	 have	 been	 structured.	 Historic	 approaches	 for	 attributing	 blame	 to	
corporations	were	based	on	the	assumption	that	corporate	wrongdoing	could	only	be	derivative	
of	 individual	 wrongdoing.	 The	 agency	 or	 vicarious	 principle	 held	 a	 company	 liable	 for	 the	
wrongful	 acts	 of	 all	 its	 employees,	 providing	 they	 were	 acting	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 their	
employment	or	authority.	A	more	specialised	form	of	vicarious	liability	is	identification	liability,	
which	holds	a	company	liable	only	when	a	director	or	senior	officer	has	acted	with	the	requisite	
fault,	expounded	in	Tesco	v	Nattrass	[1972]	AC	153.5	Identification	theory	has	been	recognised	as	
highly	 restrictive	 and	 not	 always	 appropriate.	 The	 ‘directing	 mind’	 model	 distorts	 decision‐
making	in	large	corporations;	modern	corporations	divide	authority	in	a	myriad	of	ways	which	
create	more	than	one	directing	mind.6	This	is	demonstrated	in	the	Royal	Commission	Reports;	
even	the	school	in	Report	No.	12	(Royal	Commission	2015b),	which	was	not	a	particularly	large	
or	complex	organisation,	had	a	division	of	labour	and	knowledge.		
	
The	focus	on	individual	personnel	in	the	Royal	Commission	Reports	does	not	adequately	reflect	
the	presence	or	absence	of	organisational	fault.	The	problem	that	the	Reports	highlight	is	that	it	
is	not	what	the	upper	management	knew	or	intended,	but	what	they	did	not	know	or	turn	their	
mind	to.	In	the	bulk	of	the	Reports,	upper	management	failed	to	prioritise	the	safety	of	children	
and	 to	 develop	 and	 enforce	 appropriate	 child	 safety	 policies.	 The	 higher	 up	 in	 the	 corporate	
hierarchy,	the	less	likely	was	a	person	to	know	of	(suspected)	grooming	or	child	sex	offending.	
The	 reporting	 procedures	 at	 the	 school	 in	Report	No.	 12	militated	 against	 upper	 and	middle	
management	being	aware	of	suspicions	about	 the	offending	 teacher.	The	school	operated	 two	
separate	personnel	file	systems	—one	at	the	preparatory	school	and	the	central	file	at	the	high	
school	more	than	a	kilometre	away—and	neither	file	system	required	a	reference	to	the	other.	
There	 was	 no	 centralised	 database	 to	 record	 concerns	 or	 complaints	 or	 to	 facilitate	 a	
comprehensive	review	of	the	files	when	a	complaint	was	made.	The	separate	systems	meant	that	
complaints	were	unlikely	to	be	heard	or	seen	by	the	headmaster	of	the	Perth	independent	school,	
who	was	unaware	of	the	complaints	until	the	preparatory	master	reported	them	to	him	in	2004.	
The	school	council	and	Archbishop	were	not	informed	until	2009,	and	that	was	only	upon	the	
insistence	of	a	parent.	Upper	management	was	broadly	unaware	of	complaints	and	there	was	no	
system	to	link	information.7	When	the	headmaster	was	finally	informed	of	the	teacher’s	offending	
behaviour,	the	headmaster	arranged	a	meeting	with	the	offender,	but	the	head	of	the	preparatory	
school	was	not	present.	This	meant	that	there	was	a	lack	of	continuity	and	knowledge	in	response	
to	the	offending	teacher.	The	headmaster	relied	only	on	the	information	that	was	recorded	in	the	
files.	
	
Vicarious	principles	and	identification	theory	reflect	a	nominalist	theory	of	corporations,	which	
views	 corporations	 as	 nothing	 more	 than	 a	 collectivity	 of	 individuals;	 that	 is,	 the	 idea	 that	
corporations	can	only	act	through	individuals.	On	this	account,	the	corporation	is	simply	a	name	
for	 the	 collectivity	 and	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 corporation	 itself	 can	 act	 (or	 fail	 to	 act)	 and	 be	
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blameworthy	is	a	fiction.	These	accounts	regard	corporate	responsibility	as	derivative:	it	must	be	
located	through	the	responsibility	of	an	individual	actor.	In	contrast,	realist	theories	assert	that	
corporations	 have	 an	 existence	 that	 is,	 to	 some	 extent,	 independent	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 their	
members	(Belcher	2006).	Corporations	can	act	and	be	at	fault	in	ways	that	are	different	from	the	
ways	 in	which	 their	members	 can	 act	 and	 be	 at	 fault	 (Colvin	 1995).	 The	 details	 of	 the	Royal	
Commission	 hearings	 demonstrate	 that	 a	 realist	 approach	 is	 vital.	 The	 criminal	 legal	 system	
needs	to	develop	an	account	where	the	responsibility	of	the	organisation	is	primary:	what	the	
organisation	did	or	did	not	do;	what	it	knew	or	ought	to	have	known	about	its	conduct;	and	what	
it	did	or	ought	to	have	done	to	prevent	harm	from	being	caused.		
	
Individualistic	response	to	third	party	offending:	Mandatory	reporting	
The	necessity	of	developing	a	realist	model	is	demonstrated	in	the	shortcomings	associated	with	
mandatory	reporting	(and	related	offences),	the	pinnacle	of	the	response	by	the	legal	system	to	
third	party	offending	in	cases	of	institutional	child	sexual	abuse.	In	many	of	the	Royal	Commission	
Reports,	 victims	asserted	a	 failure	by	people	 in	positions	of	 responsibility	 to	 respond	 to	child	
sexual	abuse	or	report	 it	 to	relevant	authorities.	Historically	third	parties	could	potentially	be	
ascribed	responsibility	under	the	common	law	offence	of	misprision	of	a	felony	(since	abolished)8	
and	under	the	doctrine	of	complicity	(Smith	1991).	Currently,	offences	for	third	parties	revolve	
around	 the	 failure	 to	 report	 and	 require	 some	 form	 of	 subjective	 culpability.	 All	 Australian	
jurisdictions	 have	 some	 form	 of	mandatory	 reporting	 offences;	 these	 are	 discussed	 below.	 In	
addition,	some	states	have	introduced	other	offences:	for	example,	New	South	Wales	introduced	
an	offence	of	‘concealing	a	serious	indictable	offence’	in	1990	that	is	applicable	generally	to	all	
serious	indictable	offences;	and	in	2014	Victoria	created	the	offence	of	failure	to	disclose	a	child	
sexual	 offence.9	 Ireland	 introduced	 an	 offence	 in	 2012	 of	 withholding	 of	 information	 against	
children	and	vulnerable	adults.	All	of	these	offences	require	some	form	of	knowledge	or	belief	for	
ascriptions	of	culpability.	There	are	problems	with	this	emphasis	upon	knowledge	or	belief.	As	
outlined	above,	the	higher	up	in	an	organisation,	the	less	likely	a	person	will	have	any	form	of	
knowledge.	Moreover,	as	argued	below,	the	majority	of	third	parties	usually	lack	knowledge	or	
belief	 that	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 is	 occurring	 or	 has	 occurred,	 and	 the	 reason	 for	 this	 lack	 of	
knowledge	is	itself	systemic.		
	
Mandatory	 reporting	 offences	 provide	 a	 vivid	 example	 of	 difficulties	 associated	 with	
organisational	responsibility	and	the	limits	of	the	criminal	legal	response.	Most	jurisdictions	have	
requirements	that	reports	must	be	made	(to	police	or	child	protection	agencies)	 if	a	specified	
person	has	reasonable	grounds	 to	know	or	believe	a	child	 is	being	sexually	abused	(Mathews	
2014).	There	are	differences	across	Australian	jurisdictions	concerning	who	has	to	report,	what	
types	 of	 maltreatment	 must	 be	 reported	 and	 whether	 criminal	 or	 civil,	 state	 of	 mind	 of	 the	
reporter,10	whether	the	reporting	duty	applies	to	past	or	currently	occurring	abuse	only	and/or	
to	a	perceived	risk	of	future	abuse.	Seven	out	of	the	eight	jurisdictions	have	penalties	for	non‐
compliance.11		
	
Offences	of	mandatory	reporting	can	have	some	applicability	to	systemic	failures	(Death	2015).12	
The	 Victorian	 State	 Government	 inquiries—Protecting	 Victoria’s	 Vulnerable	 Children	 Inquiry	
(Cummins,	Scott	and	Scales	2012)	and	Inquiry	into	the	Handling	of	Child	Abuse	by	Religious	and	
Other	Organisations	(Family	and	Community	Development	Committee	2013)—and	the	current	
Royal	Commission	highlight	active	attempts,	particularly	by	religious	organisations,	to	conceal	
wrongdoing	and	protect	the	organisation:13		
	
There	has	been	a	substantial	body	of	credible	evidence	presented	to	the	Inquiry	
and	ultimately	concessions	made	by	senior	representatives	of	religious	bodies	…	
that	they	had	taken	steps	with	the	direct	objective	of	concealing	wrongdoing.	
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The	mandatory	reporting	offences	are	appropriate	for	those	who	know	about	the	perpetration	of	
child	 abuse	 and	 actively	 intervene	 to	 protect	 the	 perpetrator	 and/or	 did	 nothing.	 There	 has,	
however,	been	reluctance	to	investigate,	charge	or	prosecute	(Gleeson	2016).	Prosecutions	for	
failure	to	report	under	mandatory	reporting	duties	are	very	rare,	partly	because	of	an	emphasis	
upon	 encouraging	 reporting	 rather	 than	 policing	 it.	 Mathews	 (2014)	 has	 identified	 only	 six	
prosecutions	in	the	five	jurisdictions	across	Australia	with	a	mandatory	reporting	regime.		
	
Mandatory	 reporting	 offences	 reflect	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system’s	 focus	 on	 the	 individual	 in	
constructions	 of	 culpability,	 with	 a	 preference	 for	 requiring	 some	 form	 of	 subjective	
blameworthiness.	The	emphasis	upon	some	kind	of	subjective	element	of	knowledge,	suspicion	
or	belief	is	ostensibly	appropriate.	It	is	in	accordance	with	our	understandings	of	responsibility	
that	one	should	only	be	held	responsible	for	what	we	knew	or	intended.	How	could	a	person	or	
institution	possibly	be	held	criminally	responsible	for	what	they	did	not	know?	However,	in	many	
of	the	Royal	Commission	Reports,	the	issue	was	not	that	individuals	knew	or	believed	that	child	
sexual	grooming	and/or	abuse	was	occurring,	but	that	they	had	not	recognised	the	grooming	or	
offending	 behaviour	 at	 all.	 For	 example,	 in	 Report	 No.	 12,	 despite	 eight	 separate	 complaints	
across	time	about	an	offending	teacher’s	behaviour,	the	(former)	heads	of	the	preparatory	school	
and	headmasters	did	not	place	sufficient	or	correct	significance	on	the	concerns	raised	with	them	
about	the	offending	teacher.	All	of	them	gave	evidence	that	they	did	not	receive	any	guidance	or	
training	in	detecting	or	reporting	child	sexual	abuse	or	grooming	behaviour	(Royal	Commission	
2015b:	41).	The	Royal	Commission	found:		
	
We	are	satisfied	that	the	school	did	not	have	a	dedicated	child	protection	policy	
until	2004.	
We	are	satisfied	that	the	school’s	child	protection	policies	that	were	in	force	from	
2004	 until	 2009,	 although	 compliant	with	 re‐registration	 standards	 during	 the	
period,	were	deficient	when	measured	against	current	standards	of	‘best	practice’	
because:	
 they	provided	insufficient	information	about	how	child	sexual	abuse	occurs		
 there	 was	 no	 reference	 to	 grooming	 behaviours,	 no	 definition	 of	 grooming	
behaviours	and	
 no	instruction	on	how	grooming	behaviours	might	be	detected	and	when	they	
should	be	reported		
 there	were	no	separate	guidelines	for	handling	reports	of	(i)	suspected	child	
abuse;	 and	 (ii)	 grooming	 or	 inappropriate	 behaviour	 by	 staff	 that	 did	 not	
involve	a	specific	allegation	of	child	sexual	abuse	or	(after	2009)	fell	below	the	
threshold	for	mandatory	reporting.	(Royal	Commission	2015b:	8)	
	
The	masters	at	the	school	probably	could	not	and	would	not	have	been	prosecuted	for	failure	to	
report	because	they	lacked	knowledge	or	belief	that	child	sexual	abuse	was	occurring.	But	it	is	
this	lack	of	knowledge	or	belief	that	is	the	problem.	Their	failure	to	attach	sufficient	and	correct	
significance	 to	 the	 reports	of	 inappropriate	behaviour	was	due	 to	an	organisational	 failure	 to	
adequately	train	staff	to	recognise	and	appropriately	report	grooming	behaviours.	The	absence	
of	any	knowledge	or	belief	was	a	systemic	problem,	and	 the	current	criminal	 justice	 focus	on	
individual,	subjective	blameworthiness	is	accordingly	inappropriate	and	misguided.		
	
Conceptualising	criminogenic	corporate	culture	
The	 traditional	 focus	 on	 subjective	 culpability	 demonstrated	 in	 traditional	 constructions	 of	
corporate	liability	and	mandatory	reporting	offences	is	an	inadequate	response	to	institutional	
failure	 to	protect	 against	 child	sexual	abuse.	 It	 is	necessary	 to	construct	a	 realist	 approach	 to	
organisational	 failure.	 However,	 obstacles	 confronting	 a	 realist	 approach	 to	 organisational	
culpability	 are	 myriad	 although	 two	 dominant	 streams	 can	 be	 broadly	 summarised	 as	 the	
pragmatic	 and	 the	philosophical.	 The	pragmatic	 stream	 raises	questions	 about	 issues	 such	 as	
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offence	structures	and	how	elements	are	to	be	proven.	The	philosophical	challenge	is	a	question	
of	 why	 organisations	 should	 be	 criminalised	 at	 all;	 or	 whether,	 alternatively,	 organisational	
failure	should	be	best	left	to	the	civil	sphere.	These	two	challenges	are	frequently	referred	to	in	
tandem	and	yet	they	are	incompatible:	the	first	expresses	concern	about	issues	of	proof	and	the	
difficulties	 of	 achieving	 criminalisation;	 whilst	 the	 second	 is	 concerned	 about	 over‐
criminalisation	or	inappropriate	criminalisation	of	organisations.	
	
The	Consultation	Paper	(Royal	Commission	2016a)	based	on	the	Sentencing	Report	(Freiberg	et	
al.	2015)	responds	in	part	to	the	pragmatic	question	of	offence	structures	by	suggesting	several	
different	organisational	offences.	These	include	being	negligently	responsible	for	the	commission	
of	 child	 sexual	 abuse;	 negligently	 failing	 to	 remove	 a	 risk	 of	 child	 sexual	 abuse;	 reactive	
organisational	fault;	and	an	offence	of	institutional	child	sexual	abuse	(Freiberg	et	al.	2015:	Ch.	
6).	The	proposed	offences	have	the	advantage	of	adopting	a	realist	perspective	and	focusing	on	
organisational	culpability	rather	than	individual	culpability.	The	negligence	offences	are	the	most	
accessible	 as	 they	 propose	 including	 corporate	 failure	 into	 the	 existing	 legal	 doctrine	 of	
negligence.	It	requires	the	prosecution	to	establish,	firstly,	a	legal	duty;	then	criminally	negligent	
breach	of	that	duty;	and,	further,	that	the	breach	was	a	cause	of	the	harm	(Ashworth	2013).		
	
The	most	innovative	and	challenging	offence	proposed	is	that	of	institutional	child	sexual	abuse:	
	
An	organisation	commits	an	offence	if:	
1. A	person	associated	with	the	organisation	is	convicted	of	an	offence	of	child	
sexual	assault;	and	
(a) the	 organisation,	 or	 a	 high	 managerial	 agent	 of	 the	 organisation,	
recklessly	authorised	or	permitted	the	commission	of	that	offence	by	that	
person.	
2. The	means	 by	 which	 such	 authorisation	 or	 permission	may	 be	 established	
include	proving	that	the	managing	body	of	the	institution	or	a	high	managerial	
agent:	
(a) expressly,	tacitly,	or	impliedly	authorised	or	permitted	the	commission	of	
the	offence;	or	
(b) a	corporate	culture	existed	that	tolerated	or	led	to	the	commission	of	the	
CSA	offence;	or	
(c) failed	to	create	and	maintain	a	corporate	culture	that	would	not	tolerate	
or	lead	to	the	commission	of	the	CSA	offence.	
	
It	is	a	defence	to	such	an	offence	for	the	organisation	to	show	that	it	had	adequate	
corporate	management,	control	or	supervision	of	the	conduct	of	one	or	more	of	the	
persons	 associated	 with	 the	 organisation;	 or	 provided	 corporate	management,	
control	or	supervision	of	the	conduct	of	one	or	more	of	the	persons	associated	with	
the	organization.	(Consultation	Paper	2016a:	248‐249)	
	
The	offence	is	a	modification	of	the	Criminal	Code	Act1995	(Cth)	Part	2.5	and	requires	that	the	
organisation	or	a	high	managerial	agent	recklessly	authorised	or	permitted	the	commission	of	
child	sexual	assault.	Such	authorisation	or	permission	can	be	established	expressly	or	through	a	
‘corporate	culture’	that	tolerated	or	led	to	the	commission	of	the	offence	or	failure	to	create	or	
maintain	a	 ‘corporate	culture’	 that	would	not	tolerate	or	would	 lead	to	the	commission	of	 the	
child	sexual	assault.	Corporate	culture	is	defined	in	the	Commonwealth	Criminal	Code	Act	1995	
Part	 2.5	 as	 ‘an	 attitude,	 policy,	 rule,	 course	 of	 conduct	 or	 practice	 existing	 within	 the	 body	
corporate	generally	or	 in	the	part	of	 the	body	corporate	 in	which	 the	relevant	activities	 takes	
place’.	The	underlying	idea	of	‘corporate	culture’	is	to	cover	situations	where	there	is	a	difference	
between	 an	 organisation’s	 formal	 or	 written	 rules	 and	 its	 practices	 (Clough	 2007).14	 An	
organisation	can	defend	itself	on	the	basis	that	it	is	able	to	show	that	it	had	adequate	corporate	
management,	control	or	supervision	of	the	conduct.		
Penny	Crofts:	Criminalising	Institutional	Failures	to	Prevent,	Identify	or	React	to	Child	Sexual	Abuse	
IJCJ&SD						112	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2017	6(3)	
Despite	being	celebrated	as	‘arguably	the	most	sophisticated	model	of	corporate	criminal	liability	
in	the	world’	(Clough	and	Mulhern	2002:	138),	the	concept	of	corporate	culture	has	not	enjoyed	
practical	 success,	 with	 very	 few	 prosecutions	 testing	 the	 provisions	 for	 organisational	
responsibility	in	the	courts	and	the	(consequent)	exclusion	of	Part	2.5	from	operating	in	other	
corporate	legislation	including	the	Corporations	Act	2001	(Cth)	and	the	Competition	and	Consumer	
Act	2010	(Cth).	Practical	issues	raised	about	corporate	culture	include	difficulties	of	proving	the	
existence	of	a	culture	and	concern	that	there	may	be	varying	subcultures	within	an	organisation	
(Beaton‐Wells	 and	 Fisse	 2011).	 Questions	 have	 been	 raised	 about	whose	actions	 or	 inactions	
should	 be	 included	 in	 considering	 institutional	 responsibility	 (Royal	 Commission	 2016a).	
Concern	has	also	been	expressed	that	an	institution’s	culture	may	have	changed	over	time,	by	
which	time	the	circumstances	and	management	that	allowed	the	abuse	to	occur	may	have	long	
since	 changed.	 It	 is	 argued	 that,	 in	 those	 circumstances,	 criminal	 sanctions	 directed	 at	
organisational	change	would	be	neither	helpful	nor	necessary	(Weissmann	and	Newman	2007).	
I	 argue	 below	 that	 these	 kinds	 of	 practical	 questions	 are	 resolved	 by	 the	 detail	 of	 the	 Royal	
Commission	Reports.		
	
Although	corporate	culture	is	regarded	as	more	radical	and	innovative,	the	concepts	of	negligence	
and	corporate	culture	intersect.	Negligence	requires	a	failure	to	fulfil	a	legal	duty	of	care,	whilst,	
realistically,	in	the	bulk	of	cases	of	institutional	child	sexual	abuse,	corporate	culture	requires	the	
failure	to	create	or	maintain	a	corporate	culture	that	would	not	tolerate	or	lead	to	the	commission	
of	 child	sexual	assault.	Both	negligence	and	corporate	 culture	are	built	around	 the	concept	of	
failure.	 Critics	 have	 argued	 that	 it	 is	 anomalous	 to	 hold	 corporations	 criminally	 liable	 for	
‘permitting’	conduct,	whether	under	the	concept	of	corporate	culture	or	negligence,	which	can	be	
understood	as	no	more	than	failing	to	prevent	such	conduct,	when	the	criminal	legal	system	is	
generally	reluctant	to	hold	individuals	liable	for	omissions.15	One	response	to	this	critique	is	that,	
whilst	 the	 criminal	 legal	 system	 is	 reluctant	 to	 impose	 fault	 for	 omissions,	 an	 accused	 can,	
nevertheless,	be	held	liable	for	omissions	for	the	bulk	of	criminal	offences	once	a	legal	duty	has	
been	established	(Ashworth	2013).	All	 the	 institutions	considered	 in	case	studies	 in	 the	Royal	
Commission	had	legal	duties	to	protect	the	children	in	their	care,	and	the	bulk	of	them	failed	long‐
term	 to	 fulfil	 these	 duties.	 Not	 only	 does	 criminal	 law	 have	 a	 long‐held	 tradition	 of	 holding	
accountable	 those	who	failed	to	act,	despite	having	a	 legal	duty,	 this	 idea	of	culpability	due	to	
failure,	lack	or	absence	is	reflected	in	classic	models	of	wickedness	or	blameworthiness	(Aristotle	
2004;	Aquinas	1274[2003];	Midgley	1984/2001;	Crofts	2013).	
	
Underlying	opposition	to	corporate	 liability	 is	 fostered	by	a	 failure	to	comprehend	the	idea	of	
organisational	 responsibility.	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 one	 of	 the	 concerns	 articulated	 by	 the	
Consultation	Paper:		
	
We	know	that	perpetrators	can	be	found	at	any	level	of	an	institution,	including	in	
the	most	senior	leadership	positions.	It	is	not	clear	what	adding	corporate	criminal	
liability	to	individual	criminal	liability	would	achieve	if	the	former	effectively	was	
based	on	exactly	the	same	conduct	as	the	latter.	(Royal	Commission	2016a:	251)	
	
This	concern	reflects	a	failure	to	distinguish	between	the	individual	perpetrator	of	child	sexual	
abuse	and	that	of	the	institution	that	allowed,	or	failed	to	prevent,	identify	or	respond	to,	the	abuse	
over	 long	 periods	 of	 time	 due	 to	 a	 poor	 corporate	 culture.	 A	 similar	 argument	was	made	 by	
Cardinal	 George	 Pell,	 when	 giving	 evidence	 before	 the	 Royal	 Commission.	 Pell	 compared	 the	
Church	to	a	trucking	company	running	a	well‐maintained	fleet	that	is	not	liable	for	the	actions	of	
its	workers:		
	
If	…	the	driver	of	such	a	 truck	picks	up	some	lady	and	then	molests	her,	I	don’t	
think	it’s	appropriate	–	because	it	is	contrary	to	the	policy	–	for	the	ownership,	the	
leadership	 of	 that	 company	 to	 be	 held	 responsible.	 Similarly	 with	 the	 Church	
(Royal	Commission	2014a:	C4509).		
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This	reflects	a	focus	on	individual	liability	and	the	idea	that	an	organisation	should	not	be	held	
liable	for	the	behavior	of	a	rogue	employee.	However,	this	disregards	the	scenario,	which	emerges	
in	the	Royal	Commission,	where	(to	continue	Pell’s	metaphor),	the	truck	company	has	a	legal	duty	
to	care	for	‘some	lady’,	and	the	truck	drivers,	who	are	in	the	employment	of	the	truck	company,	
routinely	molest	these	‘ladies’	and	are	enabled	in	doing	this	due	to	conditions	of	employment	and	
the	 absence	 of	 training	 and	policies	 to	 prevent	molestation.	 This	 produces	 a	wholly	 different	
blame	 focus,	 which	 is	 increasingly	 recognised	 in	 academic	 literature,	 that	 the	 corporation	 is	
criminogenic:	 that	 is,	 corporations	 by	 their	 nature	 and	 culture	 can	 produce	 crime	 (Apel	 and	
Paternoster	 2009;	 Tombs	 and	Whyte	 2014;	 Green	 and	Ward	 2004).	 For	 example,	 the	 United	
Kingdom	Law	Reform	Commission	had	considered	a	similar	situation	to	that	proposed	by	Pell	in	
1996	and	made	the	following	response:		
	
...	 a	 truck	 driver	 causes	 death	by	dangerous	driving	 in	 the	 course	 of	 his	 or	 her	
employment.	This	would	not,	of	itself,	involve	a	management	failure.	If,	however,	
it	was	found	that	the	death	occurred	because	the	driver	was	over‐tired	due	to	the	
requirement	to	work	excessive	hours,	this	could	be	due	to	a	management	failure	
for	which	the	company	could	be	liable,	assuming	that	failure	fell	far	short	of	what	
would	be	reasonably	expected	in	the	circumstances	(United	Kingdom	Law	Reform	
Commission	cited	in	Clough	2007:	296‐297).	
	
The	Royal	Commission	Reports	repeatedly	detail	ongoing	failures	to	prevent	child	sexual	abuse	
within	institutions,	demonstrating	that	the	abuse	was	not	a	one‐off,	tragic	‘accident’	but	was	due	
to	 the	 corporate	 culture	 of	 the	organisation.	 The	Consultation	Paper	noted	 that	 the	 following	
situations	allow	criminal	behaviour:	
	
 Situations	can	provide	the	opportunity	that	allows	a	criminal	response	to	occur.	
For	example,	a	lack	of	supervision	could	provide	this	opportunity.	
 Opportunistic	perpetrators	are	unlikely	to	actively	create	opportunities	but	are	
likely	to	recognise	and	take	any	that	arise.	
 Situational	perpetrators	are	unlikely	to	create	or	identify	opportunities.		 	
 Situations	influence	criminal	behavior.	
 Situations	 present	 behavioural	 cues,	 social	 pressures	 and	 environmental	
stressors	that	trigger	a	criminal	response.	For	example,	a	sense	of	emotional	
congruence	with	a	child	might	turn	into	a	sexual	incident.	
 Situational	perpetrators	are	most	 likely	 to	be	 influenced	by	 these	 triggers	 to	
commit	abuse.	(Royal	Commission	2016a:	250)	
	
Arguments	against	organisational	responsibility	for	failure	to	prevent	or	respond	to	child	sexual	
abuse	 fail	 to	 recognise	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 organisation	 itself	 is	 responsible	 for	 on‐going	
situations	which	have	allowed	or	provided	opportunities	for	offending	(Palmer	and	Moore	2016).	
Good	corporate	culture	can	prevent	wrongdoing,	whilst	bad	corporate	cultures	might	encourage	
or	fail	to	discourage	some	wrongdoing	(Gilchrist	2012‐2013;	Palmer	2012).		
	
Attributing	blameworthiness	 to	organisations	due	 to	 failure—whether	 through	 the	concept	of	
negligence	or	corporate	culture—is	potentially	broad	and,	accordingly,	they	have	been	resisted	
by	 the	 corporate	 world	 and	 even	 by	 governments	 that	 might	 be	 held	 accountable	 for	 their	
negligent	 acts	 under	 such	 laws	 (Hogg	 2013).	 As	 I	 argue	 below,	 the	 Royal	 Commission	 has	
provided	clear	examples	of	cultures	in	organisations	that	have	failed	to	prevent	institutional	child	
sexual	abuse	and	has	also	demonstrated	common	sense	approaches	as	to	how	a	prosecutor	might	
prove	a	criminal	corporate	culture	(Woolf	1997).		
	
The	 Royal	 Commission	 has	 provided	 a	 myriad	 of	 examples	 of	 criminal	 negligence	 and/or	
corporate	 culture	 tolerating	 or	 failing	 to	 prevent	 child	 sex	 offending.	 Report	 No.	 12	 (Royal	
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Commission	2015b)	is	by	no	means	the	worst	(or	best)	example	of	organisational	failure,	but	it	
provides	a	clear	example	of	how	and	why	criminal	failure	could	and	should	be	established.	For	
example,	 a	 common	 problem	 in	 institutions	 is	 that	 staff	 have	 not	 been	 trained	 to	 recognise	
grooming	behaviour.	In	Report	No.	12,	the	staff	did	not	realise	they	were	witnessing	grooming	
behaviour,	but	 still	 regarded	 it	 as	sufficiently	 ‘inappropriate’	 to	 report	 it	 to	management.	The	
positive	effects	of	even	minimal	knowledge	of	grooming	were	demonstrated	in	Report	No.	12	by	
a	mother	who	watched	a	Four	Corners	national	television	program	called	Unlocking	the	Demons	
(Australian	Broadcasting	Corporation	2005)	which	explained	how	paedophiles	 groom	victims	
and	their	families.	As	a	consequence	of	this	program,	the	mother	raised	her	concerns	about	the	
offending	 teacher	 with	 the	 preparatory	 school	 head.	 She	 felt	 that	 her	 family	 may	 have	 been	
‘groomed’	 by	 the	 offending	 teacher	 and	 communicated	 her	 concerns	 about	 the	 attention	 the	
offending	teaching	had	shown	to	both	her	sons.	This	demonstrates	an	example	of	negligence—a	
failure	to	meet	a	duty	of	care	to	protect	children	in	their	care—and	corporate	culture—the	failure	
to	create	a	culture	that	does	not	tolerate	abuse.	Teaching	staff	to	recognise	and	report	grooming	
behavior	is	a	fundamental	way	to	protect	against	and	respond	to	child	sexual	abuse.	
	
Not	only	was	there	a	lack	of	training	of	staff	about	recognising	and	reporting	grooming	and	child	
sexual	 abuse,	 there	 was	 also	 a	 culture	 of	 bullying	 so	 that	 staff	 were	 afraid	 to	 report	 their	
suspicions.	Teachers	gave	evidence	that	they	were	afraid	to	report	not	only	because	their	lack	of	
training	meant	they	were	not	confident	that	they	were	dealing	with	child	sexual	abuse,	but	also	
because	they	were	concerned	they	would	be	subjected	to	rejection,	ostracism,	bullying	and/or	
harassment	from	some	staff	if	they	were	identified	as	‘whistle	blowers’.	An	example	of	some	of	
these	 ramifications	 includes	 those	 experienced	 by	WG	who,	 after	 she	 reported	 the	 offending	
teacher	 to	 YN,	 the	 then	 head	 of	 the	 preparatory	 school,	WG	 felt	 that	 some	 of	 the	 older	male	
teachers	were	‘nasty	to	her’.16	She	communicated	the	bullying	to	the	new	head	of	the	preparatory	
school,	YK,	and	described	an	incident	where	another	teacher	had	tried	to	run	her	over.	WG	said	
she	felt	that	the	new	head	‘did	not	want	to	know	about	it’.	WG	said	she	stopped	working	at	the	
school	because	of	 the	way	she	was	 treated	by	her	colleagues	after	reporting	the	abuse	(Royal	
Commission	2015b:	32).	Awareness	of	the	protective	culture	around	the	offending	teacher	was	
shown	in	2004,	when	the	head	of	school	asserted	that,	if	he	had	dismissed	the	offending	teacher,	
it	would	have	caused	‘division	amongst	other	teachers’	(Royal	Commission	2015b:	39).	Fear	of	
reporting	due	to	 lack	of	knowledge	about	grooming	behavior	was	exacerbated	by	the	bullying	
culture.	Both	ignorance	and	bullying	could	and	should	have	been	addressed	by	management	and	
this	failure	to	do	so	created	an	environment	that	facilitated,	tolerated	and	failed	to	prevent	child	
sex	 offending.	 The	 continuation	 of	 the	 bullying	 reflects	 one	 practical	means	 of	 establishing	 a	
corporate	culture	by	analysing	who	is	rewarded	and/or	protected	by	management	and	who	is	
punished	(Woolf	1997).		
	
Despite	 ignorance	 and	 the	 culture	 of	 fear,	 there	 were	 clear	 reports	 by	 multiple	 teachers	 of	
consistently	inappropriate	behavior	by	the	offending	teacher.	One	teacher	wrote:		
	
We	are	not	suggesting	anything	more	serious	(as	in	‘sexual’)	has	occurred.	We	have	
no	proof	of	anything	like	that.	However	there	are	several	aspects	to	our	concerns.	
First	and	foremost	is	the	safety,	both	physically	and	emotionally	of	all	children	who	
have	come	and	will	come	into	contact	with	YJ.	Even	if	what	has	been	outlined	in	
this	 letter	 is	 the	 total	 extent	 of	 what	 has	 occurred,	 I	 believe	 it	 is	 still	 totally	
unacceptable	 within	 any	 organisation	 let	 alone	 any	 school	 and	 especially	 our	
school	(Royal	Commission	2015b:	23).	
	
In	other	words,	there	was	sufficient	evidence	of	inappropriate	behaviour	by	the	offending	teacher	
to	require	and	justify	a	response	by	the	school.	Despite	this	the	school’s	response	was	grossly	
inadequate.	At	times	the	preparatory	school	master	did	nothing	in	response	to	a	complaint	except	
file	it.	Where	there	was	a	response	by	the	preparatory	head,	this	tended	to	involve	a	meeting	with	
the	offending	teacher,	who	was	informed	that	his	behaviour	was	inappropriate	and	that	he	should	
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modify	his	own	behaviour.	Even	the	teacher’s	response	at	these	meetings	should	have	raised	red	
flags.	For	example,	 in	one	meeting,	he	said	that	 ‘he	had	always	dealt	with	students	 in	a	 tactile	
manner’	 (Royal	 Commission	 2015b:	 22).	 The	 headmaster	 of	 the	 school	 resolved	 to	 keep	 the	
offender	under	closer	supervision	and	scrutiny,	but	did	not	do	this.	Management	wrote	formal	
letters	of	warning,	but	the	teacher	refused	to	acknowledge	or	sign	these.	After	the	third	and	‘final	
warning’,	the	headmaster	then	sent	another	‘final	warning’.	This	response	by	management	was	
inadequate	and	inappropriate.	It	gave	a	message	to	the	offender	and	also	the	staff	that	there	were	
no	 repercussions	 for	 grooming	 behaviour.	 This	 discouraged	 staff	 from	 reporting	 offending	
behaviour	and	encouraged	the	offender	to	continue.	The	failure	by	the	headmasters	to	respond	
appropriately	was	partly	due	to	a	lack	of	training	and	policies.17	This	was	exacerbated	by	a	failure	
to	report	concerns	to	the	police,	child	protection	officers	or	anyone	who	had	experience	in	the	
protection	of	children.	Reports	of	the	offending	teacher’s	behaviour	to	any	of	these	experts	would	
likely	have	prevented	a	continuation	of	his	overt	grooming	behaviour.	The	school	needed	to	have	
developed	 clear	 written	 policies	 on	 how	 to	 detect	 child	 abuse	 of	 grooming	 behaviours,	 the	
procedures	 for	 reporting	 child	 abuse	 or	 grooming	 behaviours,	 handling	 complaints,	 expert	
training	 for	 staff	 on	 detecting	 and	 reporting	 child	 abuse	 and	 grooming	 behaviour,	 and	 an	
environment	 which	 is	 conducive	 to	 staff,	 parents	 and	 students	 reporting	 concerns	 (Royal	
Commission	2015b:	10).	This	aspect	of	Report	No.	12	goes	toward	addressing	the	question	of	how	
prosecutors	will	differentiate	between	cultures	and	subcultures.	It	is	apparent	from	Report	No.	
12	 that	 the	 dominant	 culture,	 supported	 by	 managerial	 staff,	 failed	 to	 prevent	 and/or	 react	
appropriately	to	child	sexual	abuse.	Individual	staff	members	spoke	out	against	the	offender	and	
the	culture	but	they	were	acting	as	individuals	rather	than	a	competing	subculture.		
	
Report	No.	12,	along	with	other	Royal	Commission	reports,	highlights	systemic	problems	that	go	
beyond	the	organisations.	This	reflects	Hogg’s	(2013)	argument	that	the	state	may	refrain	from	
introducing	organisational	law	reforms	because	they	have	the	potential	to	impact	not	only	upon	
powerful	institutions	but	also	on	the	state	itself.	For	example,	in	Report	No.	12,	one	of	the	reasons	
why	 the	 school	 had	 not	 ensured	 that	 appropriate	 procedures	were	 enforced	was	 due	 to	 the	
registration	 process	 undertaken	 by	 independent	 schools	 in	 Western	 Australia.	 Despite	
complaints	 on	 file	 about	 the	 offending	 teacher	 dating	 from	 1999	 onwards,	 the	 school	 was	
approved	for	registration	in	2004	until	2010.	The	registration	report	stated	that	the	school	had	
developed	 and	 implemented	 a	 child	 protection	 policy	 and	 that	 its	 documented	 policies	 and	
procedures	 were	 of	 a	 very	 high	 standard	 (Royal	 Commission	 2015b:	 15).	 The	 registration	
standards	 had	 not	 incorporated	 the	 concept	 of	 grooming	 behaviors.	 Nor	 were	 there	 clear	
standards	regarding	the	reporting	of	allegations	of	child	sexual	abuse.	The	Western	Australian	
registration	standards	did	not	clearly	articulate	 the	current	standards	or	benchmarks	 to	child	
protection	policies	and	procedures	against	which	best	practice	is	assessed	and	a	school	registered	
(Royal	 Commission	 2015b:	 16).	 There	 were	 two	 major	 shortcomings	 associated	 with	 the	
registration	process.	The	first	was	the	approval	of	inadequate	policies.	The	second	was	the	focus	
of	the	registration	process	upon	(abstract)	policies	rather	than	the	culture	and	practices	of	the	
school.	This	absence	of	adequate	and	appropriate	regulatory	standards	may	reflect	and	reinforce	
the	difficulties	of	imposing	organisational	liability.	The	systemic,	cultural	problems	went	beyond	
the	school,	to	the	state	and	national	levels	of	regulation	and	enforcement,	a	problem	not	isolated	
to	Report	No.	12	or	to	Western	Australia	(Mathews	2017).		
	
Report	No	12	demonstrates	how	corporate	culture	tolerated	or	led	to	the	commission	of	child	
sexual	offences	and	failed	to	create	or	maintain	a	corporate	culture	that	would	not	tolerate	or	lead	
to	 the	 commission	 of	 child	 sex	 offences.	 Overall,	 the	Royal	 Commission	 concluded	 that,	 taken	
together,	the	history	of	events	indicates	‘a	 serious	systemic	failure	to	protect	children	in	the	care	
of	the	School’	(Royal	Commission	2015b:	40‐41).	Organisations	involved	in	the	care	of	children	have	
existing	statutory	and	common	law	duties	of	care.	Negligence	requires	a	breach	of	that	duty	of	
care	whilst	corporate	culture	requires	toleration	or	the	failure	to	create	or	maintain	a	culture	that	
would	 not	 tolerate	 or	 lead	 to	 the	 commission	 the	 child	 sexual	 assault.	 Standards	 provide	 a	
measure	 against	 which	 to	 compare	 the	 procedures	 and	 actions	 of	 an	 institution	 against	 a	
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‘reasonable’	 institution.	 It	 is	 essential	 to	 articulate	 appropriate	 standards	 of	 care	 and	 then	
measure	organisations	against	these	standards.	In	response	to	general	shortcomings	in	state	and	
national	standards,	the	Royal	Commission	has	developed,	articulated	and	clarified	the	national	
principles	 for	 child	 safe	 institutions	 that	 should	 be	 required	 of	 individuals	 and	 organisations	
involved	 in	 the	 care	 of	 children	 (Royal	 Commission	 2016b;	 Valentine	 et	 al.	 2016).	 Of	 the	 ten	
principles	developed	by	the	Royal	Commission,	the	bulk	focus	on	the	development	of	institutional	
governance	and	policies.	Based	on	the	Royal	Commission	findings,	it	should	not	be	that	difficult	
to	develop	a	national	standard	of	care	that	is	applicable	and	enforced	across	states.	Interestingly,	
whilst	 the	 Royal	 Commission	 recognises	 that	 a	 key	 issue	 to	 creating	 child	 safe	 institutions	 is	
‘holding	 institutions	 to	 account	 through	 independent	 oversight	 and	 monitoring’	 (Royal	
Commission	 2016b:	 2),	 at	 the	moment,	 this	 is	 only	 implicit	 in	 the	 ten	 principles	 rather	 than	
expressly	articulated.	Regardless	of	whether	an	institutional	criminal	offence	is	created	based	on	
negligence	or	corporate	culture,	the	terms	of	the	offence	address	fears	of	over‐criminalisation.	In	
order	 to	 be	 successfully	 prosecuted,	 the	 failure	 to	 meet	 ‘reasonable	 standards’	 must	 be	
sufficiently	negligent	to	justify	the	imposition	of	criminal	sanctions.	One‐off	or	isolated	failures	
will	 not	 be	 sufficient	 to	 justify	 attributions	 of	 criminal	 blameworthiness.	 If	 all	 reasonable	
measures	had	already	been	employed	to	stop	child	sex	offending,	then	the	goals	of	the	criminal	
law	in	relation	to	the	organisation	would	have	already	been	met	and	the	organisation	would	not	
be	prosecuted.	The	case	studies	in	the	Royal	Commission	provide	examples	of	long‐term	systemic	
failures	by	institutions.	Organisations	which	provide	care	of	children	must	establish	cultures	in	
which	prevention	of	child	sexual	abuse	is	accepted	as	an	ordinary	responsibility	of	all	adults	and	
the	organisation.	Failure	to	do	so	means	that	the	corporation	is	criminogenic	and	can	and	should	
be	prosecuted.		
	
The	 idea	 of	 failure	 underlying	 organisational	 culpability	 can	 assist	 in	 developing	 appropriate	
parameters	in	terms	of	prosecution	and	punishment.	For	example,	 in	the	United	Kingdom,	the	
Bribery	Act	2010	(UK)	specifies	that	an	organisation	will	be	guilty	of	corporate	failure	to	prevent	
offences	of	bribery	unless	it	can	prove	that	it	had	adequate	procedures	to	prevent	the	conduct	
(Wells	2014).	The	Act	 then	details	 six	principles	 based	on	 the	Organisation	 for	Economic	Co‐
operation	 and	 Development	 (OECD)	 guidelines	 on	 compliance	 (OECD	 2010)	 that	 comprise	
proportionate	procedures,	top‐level	commitment,	risk	assessment,	due	diligence,	communication	
(and	training),	and	monitoring	and	review.18	These	principles	of	compliance	could	be	developed	
to	determine	whether	there	was	commitment	by	an	organisation	to	a	culture	to	the	prevention	of	
child	sexual	abuse.	This	would	also	circumvent	concerns	about	prosecuting	an	organisation	for	
past	 failures	 from	which	 it	had	since	 reformed.	Moreover,	 in	 the	Australian	and	 international	
context,	 increasing	 reliance	 is	 placed	 upon	 ‘deferred	 prosecutions’	 or	 remedies	 such	 as	
‘compliance	 programs’	 or	 ‘enforceable	 undertakings’	 to	 use	 the	 threat	 of	 criminal	 legal	
prosecutions	 and/or	 sanctions	 to	 compel	 corporations	 to	 comply	 with	 existing	 regulatory	
standards	(Belcher	2006;	Parker	2004).	This	provides	an	incentive	to	management	to	undertake	
responsive	organisational	change	(Fisse	and	Braithwaite	1993;	Weissmann	and	Newman	2007).	
	
Conclusion	
Systemic	 failure	extends	beyond	the	 types	of	 institutions	 investigated	by	 the	Australian	Royal	
Commission	 to	 legal	 institutions.	 The	 enforcement	 of	 regulatory	 laws	 has	 not	 always	 been	
vigorous	and	 there	have	been	no	prosecutions	of	 any	organisations	 investigated	by	 the	Royal	
Commission.	 This	 reflects	 opposition	 by	 corporations	 generally	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 collective	
responsibility	 (Wells	 2001,	 2010).	 One	 key	 argument	 to	 justify	 criminalisation	 of	 collective	
wrongdoing	is	to	emphasise	the	expressive	power	and	role	of	the	criminal	law	(Gilchrist	2012‐
2013).	The	criminal	legal	system	explicitly	and	implicitly	organises	and	depicts	conceptions	of	
wrongfulness	or	badness	as	part	of	its	system	of	blaming,	in	addressing	the	core	issue	of	what	is	
required	to	be	sufficiently	culpable	to	justify	the	attribution	of	criminality	and	the	application	of	
sanctions.	The	law	routinely	classifies	conduct,	defines	action,	 interprets	events	and	evaluates	
worth;	 it	 then	 sanctions	 these	 judgments	 with	 the	 force	 and	 authority	 of	 law	 (Crofts	 2013).	
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Criminal	liability	carries	‘a	formal	and	solemn	pronouncement	of	the	moral	condemnation	of	the	
community’	(Hart	Jr	1958).	Conviction	carries	with	it	serious	consequences	and	social	stigma.	It	
expresses	 condemnation:	 it	 is	 not	 about	 just	 wearing	 a	 penalty	 for	 breaking	 the	 law	 but	
opprobrium.	This	expressive	aspect	of	the	law	has	value	(Garland	1990).	Moreover,	it	has	been	
suggested	 by	 theorists	 that	 criminalising	 corporate	 conduct/failures	 has	 specific	 expressive	
value:	‘[d]eterring	inefficient	conduct	is	one	socially	desired	objective,	but	repudiating	the	false	
valuations	embodied	in	corporate	wrongdoing	is	another’	(Kahan	1998).	Accordingly,	the	fact	of	
condemnation	is	itself	significant.		
	
The	law	asserts	models	of	right	and	wrong,	good	and	bad,	and	this	assertion	is	enforced	with	the	
imposition	of	sanctions.	Theorists	have	recognised	and	argued	that	the	form	of	the	law	will	affect,	
reflect	and	reinforce	perceptions	of	the	morality	of	a	particular	practice	or	behaviour.19	The	Royal	
Commission	 Consultation	 Paper	 is	 similarly	 premised	 on	 ‘the	 importance	 of	 seeking	 and	
obtaining	a	criminal	justice	response	to	any	child	sexual	abuse	in	an	institutional	context’	(Royal	
Commission	2016a:	Ch.	2).	The	symbolic,	expressive	power	of	the	law	is	important,	which	is	why	
it	 is	disappointing	 that	 there	was	not	more	 focus	on	 collective	 culpability	 in	 the	Consultation	
Paper.	Reforming	the	criminal	law	in	this	area	proffers	an	opportunity	to	reframe	our	notions	of	
culpability.	It	is	not	an	unfortunate	accident	or	bad	luck	that	offenders	have	been	able	to	offend	
with	 impunity	 across	 months	 and	 years	 in	 specific	 institutions	 (Death	 2015).	 The	 Royal	
Commission	hearings	have	provided	repetitive	and	remarkably	consistent	examples	of	the	ways	
in	which	specific	organisations	tolerated,	facilitated	or	failed	to	prevent	child	sexual	abuse,	and	
these	organisations	can	and	should	be	regarded	as	criminogenic.	
	
The	failure	to	prosecute	or	conceptualise	harms	caused	by	corporations	as	culpable	has	its	own	
symbolism.	It	suggests	that	‘corporations	may	violate	criminal	laws	if	they	are	willing	to	pay	for	
it.	Corporate	crime	would	thus	be	little	more	than	a	menu	of	harms	and	prices’	(Gilchrist	2012‐
2013).	There	is	currently	a	disjunction	between	community	responses	to	organisational	failure	
and	 the	 response	 of	 the	 law.	 It	 is	 not	 simply	 a	matter	 of	 a	 legal	 demand	 for	 culpability	 for	 a	
criminal	conviction	that	did	not	adequately	meet	moral	condemnation.	But	the	structure	of	the	
criminal	 law	 has	 prevented	 any	 inquiry	 whatsoever	 into	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 corporate	
organisation	is	at	fault	for	facilitating,	tolerating,	or	failing	to	prevent	child	sex	offending.	We	need	
imagination	and	creativity	to	develop	and	structure	notions	of	collective	liability	that	adequately	
reflect	and	reinforce	the	fault	and	responsibility	of	organisations	for	crime.		
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1	Many	thanks	to	Yolanda	Thomas	for	her	excellent	research	assistance.	
2	For	further	information	refer	to	the	Royal	Commission	website:	https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/.		
3	 The	 United	 Kingdom	 is	 currently	 undertaking	 an	 Independent	 Inquiry	 into	 Child	 Sexual	 Abuse	 (see	
https://www.iicsa.org.uk/).		
4	The	Herald	of	Free	Enterprise	was	a	ferry	that	capsized	soon	after	leaving	the	Belgian	port	of	Zeebrugge	in	1987.	The	
official	inquiry	found	the	sinking	was	caused	by	a	failure	to	close	the	bow	doors	and	the	failure	to	check	if	the	doors	
were	closed.	The	Southall	rail	crash	occurred	in	1997	at	Southall	after	a	high‐speed	train	failed	to	stop	at	a	red	signal	
and	collided	with	a	freight	train	crossing	its	path.	The	incident	resulted	in	seven	deaths	and	139	injuries.		
5	These	general	principles	have	been	adopted	in	Australia	(see	Hamilton	v	Whitehead	166	CLR	121,	127).	
6	For	examples	of	judicial	criticisms	of	identification	theory,	see	Lord	Hoffman,	Privy	Council	in	Meridian	Global	Funds	
Management	Asia	Limited	v	Securities	Commission	[1995]	3	All	ER	918;	Justice	Estey,	Canadian	Dredge	&	Dock	Co	v	R	
[1985]	1	SCR	662	at	693.	Dr	Paterson’s	role	as	Headmaster	at	Knox	Grammar	School	provides	an	example	where	
identification	theory	would	work.	Power	and	knowledge	were	centralised	in	Dr	Paterson.	He	knew	about	allegations	
of	child	sexual	abuse	ranging	across	time	at	Knox	Grammar	and	chose	not	report	these	allegations	to	regulators	or	
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the	police.	When	police	were	investigating	one	report,	he	did	not	apprise	the	officer	of	other	reports	that	he	knew	
were	relevant	(Royal	Commission	2016c)		
7	 The	 experience	 of	 staff	 at	 the	 school	 in	 Report	 No.	 12	 (Royal	 Commission	 2015b)	 was	 different	 from	 other	
organisations.	At	that	school	the	staff	communicated	with	each	other	about	their	concerns.	In	contrast,	according	to	
Report	No.	6	(Royal	Commission	2015a),	staff	did	not	communicate	their	concerns	with	each	other	as	much,	and	the	
lack	 of	 systemic	 understanding	 of	 the	 complaints	was	due	 in	 part	 to	 staff	 expressing	 their	 concerns	 to	 different	
members	of	upper	management	who	then	did	not	inform	each	other	(Crofts	2016).		
8	NSW	has	created	 the	offence	of	concealing	a	serious	 indictable	offence	under	s	316	Crimes	Act	1900	 (NSW).	This	
offence	has	been	used	to	prosecute	the	concealment	of	serious	crimes	such	as	murder	and	manslaughter,	but	has	
rarely	been	used	to	prosecute	concealment	of	child	sexual	abuse	offences.	In	2014,	Victoria	has	created	the	offence	
of	 failure	 to	 disclose	 a	 child	 sexual	 offence	under	 s	 327(2)	 of	 the	Crimes	Act	1958	 (Vic).	 The	Royal	 Commission	
received	evidence	that,	as	of	April	2016,	there	were	three	matters	of	failing	to	report	that	had	been	recorded	since	
the	offence	commenced	(Royal	Commission	2016a:	231).	
9	Only	three	priests	have	been	charged	with	the	offence	of	concealing	sex	offences	in	Australia.		
10	 In	 four	 jurisdictions	 the	reporter	must	have	a	 ‘belief	on	reasonable	grounds’,	 and	 in	 four	other	 jurisdictions	 the	
reporter	‘suspects	on	reasonable	grounds’.	
11	For	example,	the	Australian	Capital	Territory	currently	imposes	a	maximum	penalty	of	$5,500	and/or	imprisonment	
for	a	maximum	of	6	months	(Children	and	Young	People	Act	2008	(ACT)).	The	Northern	Territory	imposes	a	$26,000	
penalty	(Care	and	Protection	of	Children	Act	2007	(NT)).	Victoria	previously	imposed	a	penalty	of	$1408	(Children,	
Youth	and	Families	Act	2005	(Vic)).	NSW	originally	provided	a	penalty	but	this	was	omitted	after	the	Wood	Inquiry	
recommendations	and	 legislation	 in	2009	(Children	Legislation	Amendment	(Wood	 Inquiry	Recommendations)	Act	
2009	No	13	(NSW).	
12	Although,	as	I	argue	below,	whether	civil	or	criminal,	there	appears	to	be	lack	of	enforcement	of	these	offences.	See,	
for	example,	the	‘Cummins	Inquiry’,	the	Report	of	the	Protecting	Victoria’s	Vulnerable	Children	Inquiry	(Cummins	et	
al.	2012),	which	noted	the	lack	of	application	and	enforcement	of	the	existing	‘Offence	to	fail	to	protect	child	from	
harm’	(Children,	Youth	and	Families	Act	2005	(Vic)	s	493).		
13	In	regard	to	the	Catholic	Church	specifically,	the	Family	and	Community	Development	Committee	(2013)	found	that	
rather	 than	being	 instrumental	 in	 exposing	 the	 criminal	 abuse	of	 children	and	 the	 extent	of	 the	problem,	 senior	
leaders	of	the	Church:	
 Trivialised	the	problem	
 Contributed	to	abuse	not	being	disclosed	or	not	being	responded	to	at	all	prior	to	the	1990s	
 Ensured	that	the	Victorian	community	remained	uninformed	of	the	abuse	
 Ensured	that	the	perpetrators	were	not	held	accountable,	with	the	tragic	result	being	that	children	continued	to	
be	abused	by	some	religious	personnel	when	it	could	have	been	avoided.	(Family	and	Community	Development	
Committee	2013:	xxxi).	
The	Royal	Commission	(2016c)	provides	an	example	where	the	former	Headmaster	Dr	Ian	Paterson	would	have	
been	appropriately	charged	with	mandatory	reporting	offences.	However,	the	Case	Study	also	provides	an	example	
of	systemic	failure	to	educate	teachers	to	recognize	and	report	grooming	behaviours.		
14	This	article	focuses	on	institutional	failure	to	respond	to	child	sexual	abuse.	Palmer	et	al.	(2016)	have	also	undertaken	
analysis	of	the	culture	of	‘total	institutions’	and	how	these	may	militate	against	reporting	and	preventing	child	sexual	
abuse	in	institutions.		
15	Evidence	of	Hon	Chief	Justice	Gleeson,	excerpted	in	Senate	Legal	and	Constitutional	Legislation	Committee	(c.	1994:	
31).	For	an	analysis	of	responsibility	for	omissions	in	criminal	legal	doctrine,	see	Ashworth	(2013).	
16	 The	 Royal	 Commission	 uses	 initials	 to	 protect	 anonymity	 of	 individuals	 who	 give	 evidence	 before	 the	 Royal	
Commission.		
17	In	contrast,	in	the	YMCA	there	were	too	many	policies	and	principles.	Staff	did	not	know	about	the	policies	and	they	
were	not	enforced	by	management.	
18	See	also	the	United	States	Sentencing	Commission	(2004:	Ch.	8B2.1)	which	details	the	criteria	that	should	be	used	to	
judge	a	corporate	compliance	program.	
19	 For	 example,	 both	 Duster	 (1970)	 and	 Manderson	 (1993)	 have	 undertaken	 analysis	 of	 drug	 laws	 in	 different	
jurisdictions	and	have	argued	that	a	change	in	the	legal	status	of	drug	laws	leads	people	to	think	of	an	activity	as	
immoral	even	though	they	had	not	thought	so	previously.	Immoral	connotations	in	relation	to	illicit	drugs	developed	
through	a	process	of	social	stigmatisation	of	drug	users,	by	shifting	from	regulation	by	the	free	market	to	doctors	and	
then	to	police	and	criminal	justice	agencies.	The	intersection	of	law	and	morality	has	also	been	argued	in	relation	to	
the	production	of	sexual	identities.	See,	for	example,	Crofts	(2010);	Stychin	(1995).	
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